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Why I Am Not a Buddhist, by Evan Thompson. Yale University Press, 2020.
Pp. i + 230. $18 (hardcover).
LOUISE WILLIAMS, University of Notre Dame
While the title of Evan Thompson’s Why I Am Not A Buddhist suggests that
this book will give some reasons to broadly reject Buddhism, it turns out
the majority of the text is focused on the failures of a specific contemporary
flavor of the tradition: Buddhist modernism. This flavor, sometimes called
neural Buddhism or secular Buddhism, is committed to what Thompson
identifies as Buddhist exceptionalism:
Buddhist exceptionalism is the belief that Buddhism is superior to other
religions in being inherently rational and empirical, or that Buddhism isn’t
really a religion but rather is a kind of “mind science,” therapy, philosophy,
or way of life based on meditation (2).

Although not explicitly stated, Thompson suggests that one of the major
ways that Buddhist modernism manifests this commitment to Buddhist
exceptionalism is through associating religion with claims made on the
basis of faith. Thus, much of Buddhist modernism is focused on illustrating that all Buddhist claims can be grounded in empirical facts rather
than claims grounded in faith. Clearly there are other ways that one might
distinguish between religion and these other categories (“mind science,”
therapy, philosophy, or a way of life based on meditation), but from the
way Thompson characterizes Buddhist modernism this seems to be the
focus. Ultimately, Thompson rejects Buddhist modernism.
For Thompson, we can see that any palatable version of Buddhism
has to meet two key criteria. First, it has to have enough philosophical
machinery to answer a variety of pressing questions, many of which are
grounded in internal concerns about the Buddhist worldview. Second, it
has to accomplish this without depending on any faith claims. According
to Thompson, Buddhist modernists’ attempt to remove faith from the
Buddhist tradition is the right general move, but their particular execution leaves us with a version of Buddhism that is incapable of meeting the
first requirement. Toward the end of the book, Thompson remarks that he
is skeptical that any flavor of Buddhism could meet both of these criteria.
On Thompson’s view, removing faith from Buddhism means simultaneously removing the foundation of much of the philosophical machinery
holding the entire system up. Thus, we can understand the main reason that Thompson is not a Buddhist is because of his broad rejection of
faith claims.
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In general, Thompson’s book does a good job cashing out exactly what
Buddhist modernism is and some of its major pitfalls. I am quite sympathetic toward the specific reasons Thompson gives for Buddhist modernism’s inability to provide satisfactory accounts of key concepts within
the Buddhist tradition. In this review, I touch on Thompson’s reasoning
regarding three major concepts in Buddhism: no-self, mindfulness meditation, and Enlightenment.
I think a more surprising aspect of Thompson’s text is that he identifies
faith as having such a foundational role in the Buddhist tradition. Perhaps
it is just the prevalence of Buddhist exceptionalism, or the general suspicion many folks express toward religions that are better known for their
reliance on faith, but Buddhism definitely does not have a reputation for
its reliance on faith. I think a major shortcoming of the text is that the discussion of faith is largely underdeveloped. There are two obvious points
about faith that deserved more attention in the text. First, why think that
the way to distinguish Buddhism from religion is through removing faith
from the Buddhist tradition? This seems to be the move that the Buddhist
modernist is attempting to pull off, but we are not given any clear reasons
to think that this is the right way to distinguish Buddhism from other
religions. Second, on what grounds does Thompson reject the faith claims
of Buddhism? To this second point, Thompson reports that he does not
believe the relevant faith claims, but he does not explain why that is the
case. I suspect that doing so would have required a more elaborate discussion of what faith means in the Buddhist tradition. Such a discussion
would have been helpful in unpacking Thompson’s main answer to why
he is not a Buddhist.
Internal Problems with Buddhist Modernism. Much of Thompson’s
book is dedicated to exploring ways in which Buddhist modernism’s
attempt to read every aspect of the Buddhist tradition as empirically
demonstrable leads to an incoherent version of Buddhism. In general,
Thompson has two major strategies for accomplishing this. At times,
Thompson provides in-principle reasons to think that Buddhist modernism’s account fails. Other times, Thompson argues that his own way
of understanding key aspects of the Buddhist tradition are more successful than the reading provided by the Buddhist modernist. As we
know, Thompson is not a Buddhist, but he does take a lot of inspiration from Buddhism, and may even go so far as accepting components
of the Buddhist picture for his own worldview. The strongest parts of
this discussion are when Thompson points out in-principle problems
with the Buddhist modernist account. Thompson has developed several fascinating, although somewhat controversial, ways of understanding key claims from the Buddhist tradition. In this book, Thompson’s
main goal is not to explain his positive account, so the brief overview
he gives is often a bit underdeveloped. Readers who are unfamiliar with
Thompson’s work may find themselves perplexed at his explanations in
this text. I think that Thompson does a better job explaining his account
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in his other works where presenting them is his main focus. Since this
text is largely an exploration of why Buddhist modernism is false, I will
restrict my review here to the in-principle problems Thompson puts forward for the account.
One of the defining features of the Buddhist account is the claim
that there is no self. The Buddhist modernist’s interpretation of the
no-self doctrine is that the self is an illusion that is created by the brain.
Thompson gives two major reasons that this interpretation fails for the
Buddhist modernist: (1) it is overly simplistic and (2) “cognitive science
doesn’t show that the self is an illusion. . . . Rather, it indicates that the
self is a construction” (89). The first point has to do with the complex
history around the development of the Buddhist philosophical system.
This is especially focused on debates with non-Buddhist traditions who
accuse the tradition of being a kind of nihilism about the self. Buddhist
modernism fails to recognize any of the nuance of this debate and thus
presents a very underdeveloped version of the no-self doctrine. Because
the modernists’ version of no-self is so thin, it ultimately undermines the
coherence of the account. The second point has to do with Thompson’s
preferred way to understand evidence from cognitive science. As I said
earlier, I am bracketing Thompson’s positive account for purposes of
this review.
Another major tenet that Buddhist modernism attempts to account
for is mindfulness meditation. Buddhist modernism argues that mindfulness meditation is supposedly superior to any non-Buddhist forms
of meditation because Buddhist mindfulness meditation “exists purely
in the head” (139). Mindfulness meditation, according to the Buddhist
modernist, is supposed to be something that can be measured and evaluated through the tools of neuroimaging. Thompson argues that this is
a fundamental misunderstanding of what mindfulness meditation is.
For Thompson, mindfulness meditation does not merely exist “in the
head,” any more than parenting exists inside the brain. Mindfulness
meditation “consists of certain emotional and cognitive skills and putting those skills into play in the social world” (130). Here Thompson
accuses Buddhist modernism of feeding into a kind of selfish individualism which many Buddhists object to. It suggests that “all you
really need to deal with is your own mind, not the larger social setting”
(131). Ultimately, this individualism is “counter to the whole point of
the Buddhist tradition” (131). Meditation is not about you going alone
to manipulate your brain in certain ways. Meditation is about training
yourself to become aware of different societal and environmental elements of the inner and outer world.
The goal of Buddhism is to help folks escape the cycle of suffering and
reach Enlightenment. Every form of Buddhism must have some way to
make sense of this goal state. As with all major concepts in the tradition,
Buddhist modernism strives to explain Enlightenment in purely scientific
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terms. They opt for understanding Enlightenment as a kind of psychological state. Thompson’s major objection to this strategy has to do with
what that psychological state amounts to. In order to evaluate whether
we can coherently make sense of Enlightenment as a purely psychological state, we need to know, in some detail, the contents of that psychological state. For example, is it conceptual or nonconceptual? Answers to
these questions can have profound philosophical implications when we
look at the view as a whole. We need to know a lot of details in order to
evaluate (1) if it makes sense to understand Enlightenment in terms of a
psychological state and (2) if this reading produces a sufficiently robust
state that we can maintain Enlightenment as the goal state of the entire
tradition.
One of the major challenges for the Buddhist modernist here, according
to Thompson, is related to the complex history of this problem within the
Buddhist tradition. It is notoriously difficult to get a specific explanation
of what Enlightenment amounts to across the Buddhist world. There is
no consensus among various flavors of Buddhism that it is even possible
to specify the content of Enlightenment let alone what that content might
actually be. Buddhist modernists largely ignore these nuances from the
tradition. Thus, they fail to give any kind of robust explanation as to why
we should think that Enlightenment can be specified in the way required
in order to evaluate their view.
Faith in Buddhism. It is in this discussion of Enlightenment that
Thompson’s core insight about the nature of faith comes out the clearest.
It is uncontroversial that the goal of Buddhism is to reach Enlightenment.
We have to have a starting point for why we should seek out this goal
state. Afterall, if it turns out that Enlightenment is kind of ho-hum, no one
would ever have the prerequisite motivation to pursue the Buddhist path.
Although Thompson doesn’t say this explicitly, I take it that the Buddhist
modernist might think that the reason one should pursue the Buddhist
path is because it is supported by empirical science. Thompson dedicates
a chapter in his book to Why Buddhism is True by Robert Wright (Simon
and Schuster, 2017) as an example of this kind of thinking. He ultimately
dismisses this approach for two major reasons. First, he argues that asking
whether Buddhism is right or wrong is not the right kind of question to
ask. Second, the particular view put forward by Wright is heavily dependent on a bunch of contentious philosophy of science issues. If Thompson’s
arguments throughout the book are right, we can see that this general
strategy falls a bit short. Reading the Buddhist tradition in purely empirical terms fails to give us the robust philosophical machinery needed to
support the Buddhist path.
Instead, Thompson argues that the main reason one should pursue
Enlightenment is because one has faith that such a state is real and attainable. According to Thompson, this claim is the foundation to a lot of core
philosophical insights from the Buddhist tradition. Thompson argues that
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without this core foundation, there is no way to support the philosophical
machinery that constitutes the Buddhist worldview.
Buddhist modernists’ commitment to Buddhist exceptionalism, along
with their assumption that faith-based claims are unacceptable to a flavor of Buddhism that is distinct from religion, means that Buddhist modernism cannot accept any faith-based claims in their system. Thompson
suggests that this problem for the Buddhist modernist is a general problem for any version of Buddhism that fails to accept the foundational
role of faith in the system. Thompson himself reports that he does not
accept these faith-based claims about the reality of Enlightenment. He
is skeptical that any coherent form of Buddhism could be articulated
without these claims, and thus he cannot be a Buddhist.
Overall, Thompson’s book is an interesting exploration of why one
might not accept the Buddhist worldview. His answer is fundamentally if you don’t have faith in things like the reality of Enlightenment,
then you cannot be a Buddhist. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the book
is a bit too narrowly focused on Buddhist modernism. I generally find
this flavor of Buddhism to be unpalatable because it tends to ignore the
rich history of the Buddhist tradition before its recent encounters with
science. It feels a bit too steeped in what I call the “Buddhist Buffet”
problem where we cherry-pick bits from various traditions that match
nicely with our own prejudices and slap the label “Buddhism” on it.
I take it Thompson would reject my reasoning on the grounds that concerns about whether this is “authentically Buddhism” are generally misplaced since Buddhism is always an evolving tradition. But I found his
arguments against analyzing traditions in terms of authenticity largely
uncompelling.
If Thompson is right and Buddhism is importantly a faith-based tradition, which I am sympathetic to, then this is good news for scholars
in philosophy of religion. If such scholars were wary of engaging with
Buddhism because they were unsure of its relationship to religion, faith
appears to be a clear bridge concept worthy of exploration. I’d recommend
Thompson’s book for folks who are interested in unpacking some of the
problems with one of the more popular forms of Buddhism today, but not
for those looking for a broader analysis of Buddhism. For philosophers of
religion, I would especially recommend checking out Paul Williams’s The
Unexpected Way: On Converting from Buddhism to Catholicism (T. & T. Clark,
2002) as a complement to Thompson’s book. Williams ultimately rejects
Buddhism in favor of Catholicism not on the grounds of faith but largely
because of Buddhism’s commitment to no-self.

